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At the request of the United States attorney, federal courts are di-
rected by 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03' to give use immunity to a witness,
which compels the witness to testify on the condition that his testimony
may not be used against him in any criminal case. Until recently, when
§ 6002. Immunity generally
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
3 either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a commit-
tee or a subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order is-
sued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prose-
cution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or pro-
vide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United
States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judi-
cial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with
subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such
district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other informa-
tion which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an or-
der under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and-
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1976). See generaly 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001, 6004-05. See notes 135-39 &
accompanying text infra for a discussion of use immunity. For definitions and further analysis
of transactional and use immunity, see notes 125-37 & accompanying text infia. For a discus-
sion of immunity generally in the wake of the use immunity statutes and of Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), which upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity
statutes, see Bauer, Reftections on the Role of Immunity In the CrimizalJustice System, 67 J. CRIM. L.
& C. 143 (1976); Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against Compulsoy Self-
Incrimination. The Supreme Court and Federal Grants of Witness Immunity, 30 MERCER L. REv. 633
(1979); Strachan, SelfIncrimination, Immunity, & Watergate, 56 TExAs L. REV. 791 (1978).
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a defendant in a federal criminal trial requested that his witnesses be
granted use immunity pursuant to this statute, the district court judge
would deny the motion as beyond his power if the prosecutor did not
acquiesce.2 Because of the inability of defendants to have their witnesses
immunized, many witnesses refuse to testify, thereby denying to the
court and defendant potentially exculpatory evidence. In response to
defense attempts to introduce valuable evidence, two recent cases3 have
set forth different views of the right of a defendant who seeks to have his
own witnesses immunized.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith ,4 the Third Circuit held that
if prosecutorial misconduct were found on remand, a judgment of ac-
quittal would be entered for the defendant unless the government con-
sented to grant statutory use immunity to a defense witness. If
immunity were granted, a new trial would be ordered.5 Alternatively,
the judge found that under certain circumstances, the court itself should
grant judicial immunity to the witness.6 The Second Circuit, in United
States v. Turkish, 7 reached the opposite conclusion, stating that trial
judges should "summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity
whenever the witness . . . is an actual or potential target of prosecu-
tion."8 The court left open the possibility, however, that under certain
strictly prescribed circumstances, the court could intervene on behalf of
the defendant.9
2 "[A] district judge is not authorized to initiate immunity. The statute places this re-
sponsibility on the United States Attorney, who can act only after receiving approval from
the Attorney General, his deputy or an assistant. . . ." Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986,
988 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975). The appellant, Thompson, contended in an
habeas corpus proceeding that his conviction had been facilitated by perjured testimony.
The appellant's co-defendant, after the trial, swore in an affidavit that he had given a false
statement against Thompson. Even though the witness recanted his testimony, the court held
that due process was not violated and refused to grant immunity to Thompson's co-defendant
to compel him to testify.
See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981) for a list of cases.
3 Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
4 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). While the first holding in Virgin Islands is limited by the
possibility of a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutorial misconduct suggested
was basically the arbitrary and unexplained refusal to grant immunity which suggested to the
court "that the prosecution deliberately intended to keep this highly relevant, and possibly
exculpatory, evidence from the jury." Id at 969.
5 Id
6 Id See notes 88-94 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of judicially created
immunity.
7 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
8 Id at 778.
9 "If a case should arise where the witness is not an indicted defendant and the prose-
cutor cannot or prefers not to present any claim that the witness is a potential defendant,
and if the defendant on trial demonstrates that the witness's testimony will clearly be
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These two conflicting judicial approaches demonstrate the need to
analyze whether a defendant has a right to have his witnesses immu-
nized and if he does, what mechanism to use and what guidelines to
follow. The major arguments supporting a claim that a defendant has a
constitutional right to have his witnesses immunized originate in the
sixth amendment compulsory process and fifth amendment due process
clauses. While most courts reject the sixth amendment argument,' 0
some courts have been persuaded by the fifth amendment due process
analysis, especially if there is a showing of prosecutorial misconduct.1 1
Absent prosecutorial misconduct, no court has found that a defendant
has a general due process right to have his witnesses immunized, though
some courts have indicated that the right may exist in certain instances
even in the absence of misconduct.12
Given a fifth amendment violation, judges disagree as to whether
they are empowered to remedy the violation. Because the statute places
the immunity power within the prosecutor's discretion, most courts
maintain that their intervention on behalf of the defendant would vio-
late the constitutional principle of separation of judicial and executive
powers.13 Invocation of this principle unduly simplifies a very difficult
constitutional and policy struggle and is of dubious validity in light of
the courts' supervisory' 4 and inherent powers.15 It should therefore be
material, exculpatory, and not cumulative, it will be time enough to decide whether in
those circumstances a court has any proper role with respect to defense witness immu-
nity."
Id at 778-79. Concurring in the Turkish ruling but dissenting in the Turkish dicta, Judge
Lumbard was critical of the majority's view that "under certain circumstances the district
court would be under the duty of inquiring into whether or not the prosecution should grant
use immunity to a prospective defense witness." Id at 779. For a further statement of Judge
Lumbard's views, see notes 103, 109, and 114 infia.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981). For further analysis of the sixth amendment claims, see notes 17-28 & accompanying
text infia.
11 See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976). For further analysis of prosecutorial miscon-
duct as a denial of due process, see notes 35-44 & accompanying text infia.
12 See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modified sub bom., United States v. Horwitz,
No. 78-401, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1980); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting). For further analysis and discussion of instances in
which courts have acknowledged a right to defense witness immunization based upon due
process, see notes 45-69 & notes 85-89 & accompanying text infia.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981). For further analysis of separation of powers issue, see notes 113-39 & accompanying
text infia.
14 See, e.g., Note, The Supervisoo Power ofthe Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
The author observes that "[u]nder the aegis of its 'supervisory power' the Supreme Court...
has often promulgated rules broadening the protection afforded litigants in federal judicial
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possible to create a statutory framework to empower the judiciary to
grant immunity in appropriate circumstances.'
6
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT COMPULSORY PROCESS RIGHT
While commentators1 7 have asserted that the sixth amendment
compulsory process clause' 8 requires defense witness immunity, federal
courts considering the issue have unanimously rejected the contention. t9
proceedings," id at 1656, including development of the " 'tainted evidence' doctrine," id at
1658, and the exclusionary rule. Id at 1660.
15 Article III of the United States Constitution is the source of the powers of the courts.
For a discussion of the Article III powers and inferring remedies from constitutional provi-
sions, see Dellinger, OfRights and Remedies; The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532,
1540-52 (1972).
16 For proposed statutory change, see notes 146-51 & accompanying text infra. This Com-
ment does not discuss the propriety of compelling witnesses to waive their fifth amendment
privilege for the benefit of a defendant since the philosophical arguments have been volleyed
back and forth with respect to prosecution witnesses and immunity has gained acceptance.
Rather, the Comment assumes that the granting of immunity is an accepted method of ob-
taining evidence, as long as the witness' own words are not later used to convict him. But see,
Mykkeltvedt, United States v. Alessio-Due Process of Law and Federal Grants of Immunity/or Defense
Witnesses, 31 MERCER L. REV. 689 (1980), where the author suggests a "'preferred status'"
doctrine to determine whether immunity should be granted for both defense and prosecution
witnesses. Id at 705. This doctrine presumes that immunity grants violate the fifth amend-
ment right to silence. Id at 705-06. Therefore, for immunity to be granted, whoever asks for
immunity must present "persuasive and cogent arguments" proving "that compulsion orders
are essential to the public interest or necessary to prevent a gross injustice to the defendant."
Id For a discussion of the tension between the defendant's and witness' rights, see Note, A Re-
Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Usefor Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGis. 74, 83-88
(1972) [hereinafter cited as A New Usefor Kastigar].
17 See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 143 at 308 (2d ed. 1972):
"It is certainly arguable that without the right to have immunity granted a defendant lacks
'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor' as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment"; Westen, Compulso. , Process, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974). This article contains a com-
prehensive history of the compulsory process clause and an argument that "[u]nless the
defendant can be distinguished from the prosecution in significant ways, the defendant has a
presumptive right to obtain immunity for his witnesses on an equal basis with the prosecu-
tion." Id at 168; Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Wit-
nesses, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1266 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Sixth Amendment Right]. The
author's thesis is that "the compulsory process clause requires the state to provide use immu-
nity to defense witnesses unless it can justify its denial to do so." Id at 1266; Note, The Public
Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence: The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30
STAN. L. REv. 1211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as the Public Has a Claim to Every Man'r Evidence].
The author characterizes the issue in defense witness immunity as being "the defendant's
constitutional right to obtain favorable evidence" rather than "the defendant's right to immunize
witnesses." Id at 1213. The author cites a series of Supreme Court decision which suggest
that "once a defendant shows a significant need for testimony and demonstrates that the
testimony is reliable and material, the defendant's interest outweighs a broad range of general
state interests in exclusion." Id
18 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
(1981). But see, United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 226-27 (1976).
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In Washhigton v. Texas, 20 the Court held that the compulsory process
clause prohibits a state from barring a defendant's accomplice as a de-
fense witness because "[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend
to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the
attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."'21 In
rejecting the State's claims that co-defendants were likely to perjure
themselves and "that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to
the court's interest in preventing perjury,"22 the Court found that "[j]ust
as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for
the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present
his own witnesses to establish a defense."'23 Thus, if a defendant is "arbi-
trarily denied" the right to put a witness on the stand "whose testimony
would have been relevant and material to the defense," 24 the defend-
ant's compulsory process rights would require a reversal of the decision.
While the Washington case did not involve an attempt to immunize
defense witnesses, commentators suggest that "[t]he constitutional right
of the accused to obtain immunity for his witnesses falls squarely within
the language and purpose of the compulsory process clause."' 25 Courts
have rejected this argument. In a decision representative of judicial de-
nial of compulsory process claims, the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Turkish ,26 concluded that the compulsory process clause does not permit
courts to grant immunity without petition by the prosecution, and dis-
missed the compulsory process claims summarily: "[I]t is difficult to see
how the Sixth Amendment of its own force places upon either the prose-
cutor or the court any affirmative obligation to secure testimony from a
defense witness by replacing the protection of the self-incrimination
privilege with a grant of use immunity. '2
7
The Turkish decision seems basically inconsistent with the philoso-
phy inherent in Washington, which established that courts cannot arbi-
trarily deny a defendant the right to present favorable witnesses. This
principle would appear to permit a court to review a prosecutor's deci-
20 388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Supreme Court applied the compulsory process clause to the
states in Washington.
21 388 U.S. at 23.
22 Id at 21.
23 Id at 19.
24 Id at 23.
25 Westen, supra note 17, at 168.
26 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
27 Id at 774. The Turkish court summarily dismissed the sixth amendment compulsory
process argument. "Traditionally," the court wrote, "the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory
Process Clause gives the defendant the right to bring his witness to court and have the wit-
ness's non-privileged testimony heard, but does nor [sic] carry with it the additional right to




sion and fashion a remedy where the prosecutor refuses arbitrarily to
grant a defendant's witnesses immunity. Once courts recognize that a
defendant has certain rights at trial, including the right to present a
defense, they cannot permit a prosecutor to frustrate arbitrarily these
rights by declining to request use immunity for defense witnesses.
28 Of
course, if the court finds the prosecutor's decision is reasonable after ex-
amining the facts, then the courts should not interfere. The difficult
questions inherent in reviewing such a decision will be discussed later in
this Comment.
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
Courts give greater weight to the fifth amendment due process
29
claim than to the sixth amendment compulsory process claim because
due process is a more accepted, developed, understood, and enforced
right.3° Due process in criminal trials requires fundamental fairness,
3 '
that the government produce exculpatory evidence on behalf of the de-
fendant,32 reciprocity of discovery rights between the prosecution and
the defense,33 and the reversal of convictions when courts find
prosecutorial misconduct.
34
Some courts recognize that due process requires a new trial or ac-
quittal for a defendant whose witness is not immunized when blatant
prosecutorial misconduct or an intentional disruption of the fact finding
28 18 U.S.C. § 6003. For the text of the statute, see note 1 supira.
The author in Note, The Sixth Amendment Right, supra note 17, at 1280, suggests another
formulation of the arbitrariness standard:
[T]he denial of such immunity when no significant burdens would be imposed on the
state must be considered arbitrary. In determining whether an unreasonable burden
exists that would justify the refusal to grant immunity in a particular case, the court
should consider the extent to which the state has already gathered evidence against the
witness as well as the feasibility of isolating the compelled testimony or granting a delay
to ensure that the burden is unavoidable.
29 "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
30 But see, Note, The Sixth Amendment Right,supra note 17, at 1266 n.3. The writer suggests
that due process is "less clearly defined" than the "specific requirements of the sixth amend-
ment" in the defense witness immunity issue. For a discussion of due process requirements
and defense witness immunity, see Note, A New Usefor Kastigar, supra note 16, at 77-80.
31 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 (1973). In Chambers, the Court defined
fundamental fairness as "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusa-
tions." Id at 294.
32 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
33 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1972).
34 Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
In Talor, where the appellant was convicted of assault, there were several accounts of the
events which led up to the altercation. Although prosecution witnesses had earlier disclosed
one version of the incident, at trial the prosecutor permitted a different account to be intro-
duced. Because of the introduction of the perjured testimony, the court found that the appel-
lant's due process rights were violated.
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process clearly denied the defendant a fair trial.35 Serious prosecutorial
misconduct was present in United States v. Morrison,36 where a witness
who initially indicated her willingness to testify for the defendants was
advised on several occasions by the assistant United States attorney that
if she did testify, she would be subject to prosecution for perjury. The
witness was then served with an invalid subpoena to appear at the assis-
tant United States attorney's office. When she appeared pursuant to the
subpoena at a meeting with the prosecutor and the three undercover
agents her testimony would discredit, she was told that she was likely to
be prosecuted for perjury.37 Under these circumstances, the court or-
dered a retrial, finding that there was prosecutorial misconduct 38 and
that there was a violation of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment. 39 Because the prosecutorial misconduct violated the de-
fendant's due process rights, the Morson court held that the defendant
should be acquitted unless his witness was granted use immunity.
Relying on the decision in Mortson, the Third Circuit in Government
of Virgin Islands v. Smith 40 remanded the case, and directed the district
court to determine whether the prosecution had deliberately distorted
the fact finding process. 4 1 In Virgin Islands, several juveniles were on
trial for assault. The three defendants sought to introduce the testimony
of another youth who admitted taking part in the assault, implicated a
fifth youth, and exculpated the three who had been indicted. On taking
the stand, the defendants' witness refused to testify, invoking his fifth
amendment privilege. The defense unsuccessfully attempted to offer
into evidence the witness' prior out-of-court statements to the police and
then tried to obtain a grant of immunity for the witness.4 2 While the
juvenile authorities of the Virgin Islands attorney general's office, who
35 Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976).
36 535 F.2d at 223.
37 Id at 225.
38 Id at 229.
39 Id at 228.
40 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
41 Id at 969.
42 Since the witness refused to testify, defense counsel sought to invoke an exception to the
hearsay rule, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), and have the witness declared unavailable, FED. R.
EvID. 804(a)(1), so that his prior out-of-court statement could be introduced. Brief for Appel-
lant at 14-15, Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The trial
court concluded that the Government would be unable to cross-examine the witness and
therefore refused to allow the introduction of the evidence. 615 F.2d at 967. Appellant's
counsel also argued that the witness should have been permitted to look at a copy of his prior
statement. If the witness' memory was not refreshed, counsel contended that under FED. R.
EvID. 803(5), the statement should have been admitted as recorded recollection. Brief for
Appellant at 14, Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The
court did not consider the argument.
1032 [Vol. 72
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were willing to grant immunity, had exclusive jurisdiction over the wit-
ness, that office, out of courtesy, applied to the United States attorney's
office for approval. For unexplained reasons, the United States attorney
did not consent.43 The circuit court remanded the case for evidentiary
hearings to determine if the witness should be immunized to prevent a
violation of the defendants' due process rights. The court directed that
if the district court found a due process violation, the defendants be ac-
quitted unless their witness received use immunity.
44
The prosecutorial misconduct in Monson and suggested in Virgin
Islands induced the Third Circuit to protect the defendant against the
violation of his due process rights. Absent prosecutorial misconduct,
only one court, in United States v. DePalma ,45 has ruled that the defendant
was denied his due process rights because his witnesses were not granted
immunity. Several other courts have left open the possibility that given
the proper circumstances, they might find a due process violation.46 For
example, two Second Circuit opinions indicated that defense witness im-
munity might be required if grants of use immunity to prosecution wit-
nesses resulted in an "unfair advantage. '47 Under this standard, the
court in DePalma originally required that the defendant's witnesses be
granted immunity.
In DePalma, the defendant Horwitz was found guilty of charges of
43 615 F.2d at 967.
44Id at 969.
45 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), modifedsub noa., United States v. Horwitz, No. 78-
401, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1980). Virgin Islands may also be such a case because the
prosecutorial misconduct found by the court was basically an arbitrary refusal to grant im-
munity to a defense witness.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976); United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J., concurring and
dissenting). For further analysis of when courts would intervene given proper circumstances,
see notes 57-68 & accompanying text infla.
47 United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 28 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082
(1980); United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1978). In Gleason, four former bank
officers were convicted of making false entries in bank records with the intent to defraud the
United States government, bank shareholders and lenders. On appeal, Gleason, the chief
executive officer, contended that his due process rights were violated because the Government
refused to grant use immunity to his indicted alleged accomplice and co-conspirator. 616
F.2d at 27. The court declined to grant immunity noting that this was not "a case where the
Government deliberately manipulated grants of immunity to gain an unfair advantage over
any defendant. .. ." Id at 28.
In Lang, the defendant was arrested for possessing counterfeit money. He sought immu-
nity for a witness who allegedly sold counterfeit bills to Lang's girlfriend for Lang's use. Lang
claimed that his witness should be granted immunity because the Government had shown no
interest in prosecuting him for selling the bills to Lang's girlfriend. The court held that an
immunity grant would be improper because the witness would have testified to other transac-
tions with Lang for which he would be immunized. Since there was no prosecutorial miscon-
duct or "discriminatory use of immunity to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant,"
the decision not to grant immunity was upheld. 589 F.2d at 96-97.
COMMENTS
racketeering, violating the federal securities laws, defrauding purchasers
of stock, and obstructing a grand jury investigation.48 The district court
held that the prosecution violated the defendant's due process rights by
granting Horwitz's co-conspirators broad transactional immunity while
refusing to immunize probative testimony of Horwitz's witnesses. The
court granted a retrial directing that unless the prosecution granted use
immunity to two defense witnesses, the Government witnesses' testi-
mony would be excluded. 49 On remand from the court of appeals to
consider the case in light of Turkish,5° the district court reinstated the
guilty verdict because one of the defendant's witnesses was under indict-
ment and both were under continuing investigation. The Turkish deci-
sion stated that under those circumstances, immunity could not be
granted.5 ' The district court judge, however, reiterated that Horwitz's
original trial had been unfair and that only the peculiar position of Hor-
witz's witnesses as actual or potential targets of prosecution precluded
the granting of immunity.
52
The original decision in the DePalma case relied heavily on the dic-
tum in a footnote in Earl v. United States 53 the first case to consider de-
fense witness immunity.54 Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit judge,
found that Earl did not have a due process right to have his witnesses
immunized, especially because the prosecution did not request immu-
nity for any of its witnesses. Although the Earl court concluded that
"the judicial creation of a procedure comparable to that enacted by
Congress for the benefit of the Government is beyond our power, '5 5 the
court's footnote indicated that the defendant might have a due process
right to secure immunity for his witnesses, under appropriate circum-
stances, but held these were not present. The court took pains in the
critical footnote to state:
We might have quite different, and more difficult, problems had the Gov-
ernment in this case secured testimony from one eyewitness by granting
him immunity while declining to seek an immunity grant for Scott [the
48 476 F. Supp. at 776 n.l.
49 Id at 781.
50 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
5 [T]rial judges should summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity when-
ever the witness for whom immunity is sought is an actual or potential target of prosecu-
tion .... The prosecutor need only show that the witness has been indicted or present
to the court in camera an exparte affadavit setting forth the circumstances that support the
prosecutor's suspicions of the witness's criminal activity.
United States v. Turkish, 627 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981).
52 United States v. Horwitz, No. 78-401, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1980).
53 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
54 For a discussion of Earl and the transactional immunity statutes, see Comment, Right of
the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 953 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Compelled Testimony].
55 361 F.2d at 534.
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defendant's witness] to free him from possible incrimination to testify for
Earl. That situation would vividly dramatize an argument on behalf of
Earl that the statute as applied denied him due process. Arguments could
be advanced that in the particular case the Government could not use the
immunity statute for its advantage unless Congress made the same mecha-
nism available to the accused.
56
The basis of the original decision in DePalma appears to have been
that the action of the prosecution, in building its case on a broad grant
of immunity without granting immunity to the defendant's witnesses,
created an imbalance, which required the court to protect the defend-
ant's due process rights. Without mentioning DePalma, the Second Cir-
cuit in Turkish rejected this justification: "[a] criminal prosecution,
unlike a civil trial is in no sense a symmetrical proceeding."
57
Though the district court in DePalma is the only court to have
found refusals to grant defense witness immunity as due process viola-
tions in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct,58 several other courts
have indicated that they would have intervened in the proper factual
setting. Concurring and dissenting in dicta in United States v. Leonard,
59
Judge Bazelon indicated that if faced with the defense witness immunity
issue, the court should intervene on behalf of the defendant. Examining
the language of the immunity statute, Judge Bazelon found that the due
process concern of reliable jury verdicts and " 'the general principle that
a prosecutor is not free to decline to make evidence available to the
defendant' "60 might compel defense witness immunity. The Leonard
court, however, was not faced with the issue, since it was not before the
court.
6 1
Other courts recognize that proper circumstances may require
them to examine due process claims more closely. For example, in
United States v. Alessio ,62 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the appel-
5 6 Id at 534 n.1.
57 623 F.2d at 774.
58 See Note, Selective Use of/he Executive Immunity Power: A Denial of Due Process, 8 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 879 (1979-80), where the author suggests that due process violations should not be
predicated on findings of prosecutorial misconduct, id at 910, and that an evidentiary hear-
ing be held before immunity is granted. Id at 909. If the defendant's witnesses were not
immunized based upon the evidentiary hearing, however, then the author argues that a show-
ing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor should trigger a due process claim. Id at 911.
59 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting). In Leonard, the
defendant was convicted of armed robbery and burglary. On appeal, the court held that
refusal to permit defense counsel to cross-examine a Government witness concerning felony
charges pending against him and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to be cautious of
testimony of immunized government witnesses were reversible errors.
60 Id at 985 n.79 (quoting from Earl v. United States, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967)).
61 No question of defense witness immunity was presented for review. Instead, Judge
Bazelon dealt with a hypothetical situation.
62 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 948 (1976). In Alessio, the defendant
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lant was denied a fair trial as a result of the Government's refusal to seek
immunity for defense witnesses. The court indicated that the "testi-
mony sought by appellant was cumulative of the testimony of other wit-
nesses, ' 63 and thus found no due process violation. While finding that
immunity was not proper in this case, the court suggested defense wit-
ness immunity would be permissible when the government exercised
power in a manner that would deny the defendant's fifth amendment
guarantees.
64
In other decisions, the Second Circuit has indicated that under
"'extraordinary circumstances' 65 due process may require that the gov-
ernment confer use immunity on a witness for the defendant. '66 In de-
termining whether such circumstances exist, that Circuit requires a
threshold showing of "the materiality of the testimony sought from the
contended that the testimony of the three witnesses that he sought to have immunized would
exculpate him from bribery charges. The court found, however, that the testimony was cu-
mulative and declared that there was no due process violation. For a discussion of Alessio, see
Mykkeltvedt, supra note 16.
63 528 F.2d at 1082.
64 Id at 1081-82. Since Alessio's witnesses' testimony was cumulative of other witnesses'
testimony, the court found that the trial was fair and that due process was not violated. If the
witnesses' testimony had not been cumulative, the court seems to suggest that the witness
should have been permitted to testify under a grant of immunity, unless the Government had
a good reason for denying immunity. A good reason for denying immunity does not rise to
the level of prosecutorial misconduct. The lack of a good reason for denying immunity was in
substance equated with prosecutorial misconduct in the Virgin Islands case.
65 United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
In Wight, the defendant, who was accused of extortion, contended that extraordinary cir-
cumstances existed because the witness he sought to immunize ws " 'perhaps the most criti-
cal witness'" against him and his testimony was needed so that the defendant could cross-
examine him, thus assuring a fair trial. Id The court found that the witness' statement "was
not the only, nor even the most important" evidence and therefore refused to grant immunity
to him. Id
The "extraordinary circumstances" standard is also accepted by the government. The
United States Attorneys' Manual concedes that immunity for a defendant's witness should be
granted "in extraordinary circumstances where the defendant plainly would be deprived of a
fair trial without such testimony or other information." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-11.230 (Aug. 31, 1976) (unpublished manual available from the
Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL]. The nine-part Manual,
prepared by the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, is available for purchase from
the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20530, under the disclosure requirement of the Freedom of Information Act at a
per page fee. Id § 1-1.400.
66 United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
162 (1980). The defendants in Praetorius were convicted of conspiring to import, possess, and
distribute heroin. On appeal, they alleged several errors including denial of immunity for the
defendant's witness. the district court had refused to grant immunity because the witness'
testimony related solely to the credibility of another witness. Concluding that extraordinary
circumstances did not exist, the court of appeals upheld the district court because the witness'
testimony related to the credibility of another witness and did not introduce any additional
independent material evidence.
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witness," a test which the court did not deem to be met where the testi-
mony sought to be offered, "merely related to the credibility of another
witness and, as such, was not crucial to the defense of the case."'67 The
Second Circuit in United States v. Wnght 68 further indicated by way of
dictum that the "extraordinary circumstances" test was not met where
the testimony sought to be immunized "was not the only, nor even the
most important evidence."
'69
Although leaving open the possibility of relief in narrow circum-
stances, the Turkish decision continues the trend of rejection of due pro-
cess claims. In Turkish, the defendant was convicted of income tax
evasion, filing false income tax returns and conspiring to defraud the
United States.70 Several of the government's witnesses at trial were co-
conspirators involved in the fraudulent transactions. Three of these wit-
nesses who had pleaded guilty received letter agreements 7' stating that
they would not be prosecuted if they testified truthfully, as did two other
un-indicted witnesses. A sixth prosecution witness was granted statutory
use immunity.
72
After the prosecution had completed its case, Turkish and his co-
defendants moved that seventeen of the prospective defense witnesses be
granted statutory use immunity.73 Turkish argued that these witnesses
would provide exculpatory testimony, but would refuse to testify fearing
self-incrimination. The trial judge asked the prosecution to consider
granting immunity, but after consideration, the Government refused.
The trial judge subsequently denied the defense motion for a new trial
or acquittal, ruling that Turkish's motion was untimely and that none of
the witnesses' testimony would be exculpatory.
After examining Turkish's fifth amendment due process claims, the
appellate court considered two possible bases for defense witness immu-
nity. First, the court rejected the claim of "basic fairness" 74 that would
require the Government exercising the right to compel testimony to
67 Id See also United States v. Davis, 623 F.2d 188 (Ist Cir. 1980). The defendant in
Davis was convicted of conspiring to transfer and conceal a bankrupt corporation's property
and of aiding and abetting the bankruptcy fraud. On appeal, he challenged the district
court's refusal to order the prosecutor to immunize one of his witnesses. The court found that
the defendant's right to a fair trial was not denied because the witness' testimony was intro-
duced merely to establish the credibility of another witness' testimony. Id at 193.
68 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
69 Id at 35.
70 623 F.2d at 770.
71 "Letter immunity consists of a promise by the particular United States attorney not to
prosecute the witness for his participation in the transaction about which he testifies." United
States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 36 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
72 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03. See note 1 supra.
73 18 U.S.C. § 6002. See note I supra.
74 623 F.2d at 774.
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grant the right for the defendant too. The court concluded that "equali-
zation is not a sound principle on which to extend any particular proce-
dural device."' 75 While Turkish dismissed the notion that parity must
exist between the rights of the defense and prosecution, the court's rea-
soning is somewhat inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Wardius v. Oregon ,76 the Supreme Court held that due
process required reciprocity of discovery rights between the defense and
the prosecution even when reciprocity would result in the defense ob-
taining evidence to which the defendant had no independent constitu-
tional right. 7 7 Concluding that absent a showing of a strong state
interest to justify an imbalance in discovery rights, criminal defendants
are entitled to rights comparable with those available to the prosecutor,
the Court stated that "[t]he growth of such discovery devices is a salu-
tary development which, by increasing the evidence available to both
parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system."
'78
While, as the Turkish court found, the burden of proof and other
procedural hurdles favor criminal defendants,79 the assertion that an
immunity grant to defense witnesses is simply procedural is unsound as
far as the rights of the defendant are concerned.80 The right to secure
75 Id at 775. But see, MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 143 at 308, "[T]he imbalance created
by the availability of this power [granting of immunity] to the prosecution but not to the
defense may well constitute a deprivation of due process of law." Cf, Westen, supra note 17,
where he argues that "[o]ne of the prevailing themes of compulsory process is that the defend-
ant should have comparable opportunities with the prosecution to present a case through
witnesses." Id at 177. "In short," Westen writes,
it [compulsory process] seeks to maintain a basic equilibrium between the defendant and
the state with respect to the discovery, production, and presentation of witnesses. While
it does not guarantee the defendant precise equality with the prosecution, it prohibits the
state from giving so much advantage to the prosecution as to frustrate the adversary
assumptions implicit in the sixth amendment.
(footnote omitted) Id at 180.
76 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
77 Id at 472.
78 Id at 474.
79 The prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the
satisfaction of all the jurors; it may not obtain the defendant's testimony, suppress excul-
patory evidence, nor retry the defendant after acquittal. . . . The defendant, by con-
trast, may prevail without offering any proof at all; he need not disclose whatever
inculpatory evidence he discovers, may avoid conviction by persuading a single juror
that reasonable doubt exists, and may challenge a conviction by direct appeal and subse-
quent collateral attack.
623 F.2d at 774.
Reaching the opposite conclusion, one commentator has argued that in fact, "[b]oth
doctrinally and practically, criminal procedure, as presently constituted, does not give the
accused 'every advantage' but, instead, gives overwhelming advantage to the prosecution."
Goldstein, The State and the Accused Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149, 1152 (1960).
80 Despite the observation in the Comment on Immunity Provisions, in NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, II WORKING PAPERS 1405 (1968), [hereinaf-
ter cited as II WORKING PAPERS], that "[t]he immunity statutes proposed. . . consist solely
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the testimony of a witness whose testimony may acquit the defendant is
substantive in any meaningful sense. If an effective defense requires an
immunity grant to a defense witness, then the right to introduce that
information in evidence is plainly substantive."' To call such a right
procedural is to exalt semantics over substance.
Although Turkish rejected the "basic fairness" basis for defense wit-
ness immunity, the court took more seriously the second due process
claim that by refusing to grant immunity to defense witnesses, a court
blocks the admission of the defendant's exculpatory evidence. The court
-rejected this contention, supporting its conclusion by noting that various
privileges including those of attorney-client and doctor-patient often ex-
clude a defendant's evidence.8 2 This reasoning, however, is unpersua-
sive for two reasons. First, testimonial privileges are not absolute.
Several state courts have ruled that the sixth amendment requires that a
witness' claim of privilege be rejected when the witness possesses excul-
patory evidence. 8 3 Second, and more fundamentally, compulsion of
testimony by an attorney or by other parties to confidential communica-
of procedural provisions," id, the observation is at best correct only so far as the procedure for
immunizing witnesses is concerned, and not as to the question of whether witnesses should be
granted immunity. Indeed, even from the standpoint of the witness, the change from transac-
tional to use immunity is substantive since it alters the scope of fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination from overly broad protection to protection coextensive with the
fifth amendment privilege. United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Even if the
granting of immunity were deemed solely procedural from the defendant's standpoint, Gold-
stein, supra note 79, at 1192, suggests that "[i]f a procedural system is to be fair and just, it
must give each ofthe participants to a dispute the opportunity to sustain his position. It must
not create conditions which add to any essential inequality of position between the parties but
rather must assure that such inequality will be minimized as much as human ingenuity can
do so." Thus, even if the immunity statutes are merely viewed as procedural tools, due pro-
cess requires procedural fairness as well.
81 The author in Note, The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence, supra note 17, at
1221, suggests that
the court's primary question would not be whether the defense has a right to grant its
witnesses immunity, but whether it has a constitutional right to evidence withheld by the
fifth amendment privilege claim. If the answer to this latter question is affirmative, the
court could address the immunity issue as a secondary question of procedure and hold
that the defendant cannot be tried unless the state makes the evidence available.
82 623 F.2d at 775.
83 Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976) (defendant's confrontation clause right out-
weighed witness' interest in a husband-wife state communications privilege). State v.
Hembd, 305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872 (1975) (where whole theory of defense rested on
privileged information, defendant's confrontation clause right overrode a claim of doctor-
patient privilege). State v. Roma. 140 N.J. Super. 582, 357 A.2d 45, afd on reargumenl, 143
N.J. Super. 504, 363 A.2d 923 (1976) (defendant's right to compulsory process violated by
state statutory marriage counselor privilege).
Although the Supreme Court expressly reserved for future determination the question
whether the compulsory process clause applies to claims of privileged communications in
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967), state courts construe the later Supreme
Court opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) to permit the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to override a claim of privilege. In Davis, the Court permitted the fact that a key
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tions would breach confidentiality and thus thwart the basic policy of
the privilege to encourage such communications, even if procedures
could be developed to make such testimony inadmissible in other crimi-
nal and civil proceedings. 8 4 But confidentiality is not the root of the
self-incrimination privilege and testimony can, therefore, be compelled
by granting use immunity without thwarting the policy behind that
privilege.
The Turkzh court also maintained that due process is denied only
when the government withholds evidence actually in its possession. This
seems an unduly narrow interpretation of Brad v. Magland,8 5 the case
which established that the government must divulge exculpatory evi-
dence in its possession. "We now hold," the Brady Court wrote, "that
the suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution. '8 6 Relying on Brady, the Supreme Court has since
found that even if a prosecutor merely negligently fails to disclose excul-
patory evidence, the defendant's due process rights have been violated.
87
As these decisions indicate, the right to obtain exculpatory evidence may
not be denied lightly. Arguably, the arbitrary refusal by the govern-
prosecution witness was a juvenile offender to be introduced for impeachment purposes, de-
spite a state privilege statute. Id at 319.
Westen, supra note 17, at 170-77 also argues that "[a] privilege that denies the defendant
the benefit of exculpatory testimony for insufficient reasons is unconstitutional as applied."
Id at 171. Westen suggests: that the doctor-patient privilege can be constitutionally nar-
rowed, id, or modified, id at 172, the executive privilege be narrowed, id at 171, and that the
lawyer-client and priest-penitent privileges be modified by permitting "disclosure for the de-
fense while prohibiting the disclosed information from being used against the client or peni-
tent in future civil or criminal proceedings." Id at 173. For a proposed procedure to resolve
clashes between testimonial privileges and defendant's sixth amendment rights, see Note, De-
fendant v Witness Mesurng Confrontation and Compulsoy Process Rights Against Statutoq Communi-
cations Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REV. 935, 976-90 (1978).
84 Testimonial privileges are designed to promote privacy and the free exchange of infor-
mation in special relationships given statutory recognition by the states. MCCORMICK, supra
note 17, § 72 at 152, § 77 at 157.
85 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady did not concern immunity grants.
86 Id at 87.
87 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Gig'io stands for the proposition that
when there is nondisclosure of material evidence whether by "negligence or design," id, the
defendant's due process rights are violated. The petitioner in Giglio was convicted of passing
forged money orders. While appeal was pending, the defendant discovered new evidence
which indicated that to ensure his unindicted co-conspirator's testimony, the Government
had promised not to prosecute him. The co-conspirator, however, had not revealed the prom-
ise at trial under cross-examination, and the prosecutor did not correct the co-conspirator's
misrepresentation because he did not know about it. Inasmuch as the disclosure may have
cast doubt on the witness' credibility, the Court found that the defendant's due process rights
had been violated and ordered a new trial, since all material evidence had not been disclosed.
Id at 155.
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ment to grant immunity to a defense witness which prevents a defend-
ant from presenting exculpatory evidence is the equivalent of
suppression of evidence.
Indeed, this in substance was the alternative basis of the Virgin Is-
lands case. There, the court suggested that the defendant's due process
rights are violated "by the fact that the defendant is prevented from
presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his case."'8 8 To pre-
vent this violation of rights, the court determined it had "inherent au-
thority" 89 to grant immunity to defense witnesses.
The Virgin Islands court's foundation for the inherent judicial power
is grounded in several Supreme Court cases. The court relied on the
holding in Chambers v. Mississipi9° that since Mississippi's evidence rules
denied Chambers the right to introduce exculpatory evidence and thus
deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial, the defendant was
entitled to a new trial to permit him to introduce exculpatory evidence.
Similarly, the Third Circuit noted that a defendant whose witnesses are
not immunized cannot introduce "clearly exculpatory evidence neces-
sary to present an effective defense." 9 '
The court also interpreted a Supreme Court decision and two other
Third Circuit decisions92 as exercises of inherent authority to grant im-
munity to defense witnesses. Thus the court construed the Supreme
88 615 F.2d at 969.
89 Id The Third Circuit "laid the groundwork," id at 970, for judicially created immu-
nity in Herman v. United States, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913
(1979). In Hennan, the defendant was convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO). On appeal, Herman contended
that he was denied his sixth amendment right of compulsory process and that his indictment
should be dismissed. Id. at 1199. The court held that Herman had no sixth amendment
claim because the prosecutor had not threatened or intimidated any of Herman's witnesses,
id. at 1200, and concluded that there is no "general sixth amendment right to demand that
witneess... be immunized or that.. . indictments be dismissed." Id.
In addition to rejecting Herman's compulsory process argument, the court also denied
his due process claim. Due process, the court found, may be required "in a case where the
government relies on the testimony of witnesses who have received a grant of immunity, it
[the government] may have an obligation, as a matter of fundamental fairness, to grant use
immunity for defense witnesses as well." Id. at 1203. The court also rejected the due process
claim because there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 1204.
While rejecting both the defendant's compulsory process and due process arguments, the
court said that if the issue were presented, the court might have "inherent authority to effec-
tuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity
upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective defense." Id. Since the issue was
not presented, the Herman court did not actually utilize its inherent power to confer defense
witness immunity.
90 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
91 615 F.2d at 971.
92 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1978) (testimony under
Speech and Debate Clause defense); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332-33 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979) (testimony given might violate double jeopardy).
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Court decision in Snmons v. United States,93 as creating an immunity
grant by refusing to allow self-incriminatory testimony at a fourth
amendment suppression hearing to be later used against the defendant.
The Simmons Court reasoned that the use of this testimony would mean
that a defendant could assert his fourth amendment right only by sacri-
ficing his fifth amendment right. Declining to require this sacrifice, the
Court held that since the defendant had admitted possession of contra-
band to assert fourth amendment rights, he was immune from prosecu-
tion by reason of this testimony. 94 While Simmons is not precisely
analogous to the defense witness situation, it is similar in principle be-
cause the Court, in effect, without the prosecutor's request or approval,
granted immunity to the defendant for his testimony admitting owner-
ship at the suppression hearing. This decision is therefore a precedent
for the grant of judicial immunity for a defense witness to protect the
defendant's constitutional rights.
IV. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN GRANTING IMMUNITY
The potential for abuse by defendants of witness immunity has con-
cerned some courts. The Turkish court feared that the defendant and his
witnesses would participate in "cooperative perjury" 95 that would ac-
quit the defendant. A threat of a perjury conviction, the court reasoned,
would not be enough to deter this conduct since perjury is difficult to
prove and the penalties associated with perjury are often much less se-
vere than are those for the substantive crime.96 This argument does not
seem persuasive because there is also a risk of perjury (though not "co-
operative perjury") by immunized prosecution witnesses who hope to
93 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
94 Id. at 394.
95 "Cooperative perjury" is defined as when "[c]o-defendants could secure use immunity
for each other, and each immunized witness could exonerate his co-defendant at a separate
trial by falsely accepting sole responsibility for the crime, secure in the knowledge that his
admission could not be used at his own trial for the substantive offense." United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981). A court should be
resourceful enough, however, to minimize this problem by using its discretion to decline im-
munity for testimony of a witness inconsistent with that given at an earlier trial by the de-
fendant. Establishment of such a rule would reduce the incentive for witness A to perjure
himself at the trial of defendant B since witness A would know that at his own subsequent
trial, he could not obtain the benefit of "cooperative perjury" from defendant B.
96 Id. If an immunized witness gives false testimony under oath, he will be subject to
prosecution for perjury. "Under 18 U.S.C. 6002, testimony or information cannot be used,
directly or indirectly, in a prosecution of a person who provides it, except a prosecution for
perjury .. " U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1-11.212. See Hoffman, The rivi-
lege Against Se/f-Incrinination and Immunity Statutes Permissible Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16
CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 433 (1980). The author writes that "[t]he theory [is] . . .that since the
immunity is contingent on truthful testimony, perjured testimony did not benefit from the
immunity at all and was thereby available for use at a criminal trial" (footnote omitted).
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escape prosecution. Other courts are concerned with co-defendants or
other defense witnesses benefitting from immunity baths97 as a result of
immunity grants to a defendant's witnesses. 98 Once granted immunity,
a witness might take the stand and answer questions broadly to attempt
to prevent the prosecutor from relying on matters covered by his testi-
mony in a subsequent prosecution against him. This risk also applies,
however, when immunity is given to prosecution witnesses.
A corollary of the possibility of immunity bath abuse is the danger
that the prosecution will be reluctant to engage in rigorous cross-exami-
nation, fearing that the witness will disclose too much and thereby pre-
clude a future prosecution. Without effective cross-examination, the
prosecutor cannot fully explore the witness' credibility or impeach his
testimony. While this fear may have some basis, it is appropriate to
observe that a witness will have an opportunity to take an immunity
bath on direct examination. Further, the fear that a witness will disclose
too much has not deterred prosecutors from granting immunity to their
own witnesses.
Recognizing the harm that may result by immunizing a witness,
the United States Attorneys' Manual condemns defense witness immu-
nity. The Manual states that "a requirement that the government seek
to compel the testimony of defense witnesses would place the govern-
ment in an intolerable situation" because the government "would be
inundated with such requests." 99 While immunization requests may de-
lay a trial, strict judicial or statutory guidelines may reduce the number
of requests and therefore the number of trial delays.100 More fundamen-
tally, a due process right clearly takes precedence over an administrative
burden or procedural inconvenience.
An additional problem raised by the Manual is that "the govern-
97 Commonly used by courts, the term "immunity bath" means that the "[g]overnment
might be trapped into conferring unintended immunity by witnesses volunteering to testify."
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 429 (1943). .Seealso United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981). If a witness discloses information
that is potentially incriminating, he is not likely to be prosecuted because the prosecutor must
then independently derive the evidence to be able to use it. A contrasting view regarding
transactional immunity is expressed in Comment, Compelled Testimony, supra note 54. The
author suggests that
the burden on the prosecution of immunizing the witness will be negligible. The witness
may, for example, already have been prosecuted for crimes growing out of the subject
matter. . . or he may have pleaded guilty to one count in a deal with the prosecution.
It is likely that the government has little interest in further prosecution of the witness,
particularly when. . . it has already decided to dismiss charges arising from the events
about which he would be compelled to testify.
Id. at 960.
98 623 F.2d at 775.
99 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1.11-230.
100 For a discussion of proposed guidelines, see notes 142-44 & accompanying text inra.
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ment would not know what the witness' testimony would be; thus the
government would have no basis for concluding that compulsion of his
testimony might be in the public interest."' 01 This argument is not per-
sausive because the primary public interest argument, of special concern
to the prosecutor, is that the witness is a potential defendant, a fact
which is known to the prosecutor without hearing the witness' testi-
mony. To the extent the "public interest" determination involves a de-
termination of the exculpatory nature of the witness' testimony
necessary to the furtherance of the truth-seeking process so as not to
convict innocent defendants, the public interest can be weighed by the
judge. It is true that the Manual recommends that when the prosecutor
"realizes that a potential defense witness will exercise his privilege
against self-incrimination, he [the prosecutor] has discretion as to
whether he should proceed with the case in view of his estimate of the
truthfulness, materiality, and exculpatory nature of the potential testi-
mony."' 0 2 While it would clearly be appropriate for a prosecutor to
make this determination in the case of his own witness, he has an obvi-
ous bias in the case of defense witnesses and the determination as to such
witnesses should more appropriately be left in the hands of the judge.
A judge can obtain the information requisite to such a determina-
tion while protecting the interests of both the prosecution and defense
by conducting an in camera hearing at which the potential witness, his
lawyer, and a court reporter would be present. While the defense law-
yer would not be present, the interest of the defense could be protected
by the defense lawyer supplying the judge with a list of questions to pose
to the proposed witness. The answers to these questions would then be
sealed to prevent the prosecution from obtaining them. After the wit-
ness and his lawyer withdraw from the hearing, the prosecutor would
then be permitted to enter the hearing to attempt to demonstrate why
immunity should not be granted. After evaluating the prosecutor's ar-
guments the judge would determine whether the witness' testimony was
exculpatory and whether the prosecutor had demonstrated that the
public interest would not be served by granting immunity.I
0 3
101 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1.1 1-230.
102 Id.
103 See Note, The Public Has a Claim to EveA Man's Evidence,supra note 17, at 1238-41. When
the prosecutor denies a request for defense witness immunity, the author suggests that such
immunity may be obtained by requesting an "in camera hearing in which the court can
measure the proferred evidence against the materiality threshold." Id. at 1238. Other au-
thors have also suggested the use of in camera hearings in the defense witness immunity
situation. For example, in Note, Separation of Powers andDefense Witness Immunity, 66 GEo. LJ.
51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Separation of Powers], the author suggests that there be an ex
parte, in camera proceeding before the trial to determine if the defendant's potential witness
will present material evidence. Id. at 80. Since the witness' fifth amendment rights are jeop-
ardized when the prosecutor is aware of information from the witness' own mouth, a neutral
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Another reason prosecutors are reluctant to ask for witness immu-
nity is that the government must sustain a "heavy burden"' 10 4 to prove
that the evidence later used to prosecute the witness 0 5 was not obtained
as a result of the immunized testimony. 0 6 The government rarely suc-
ceeds in proving independent derivation because of this burden, and
thus prefers to grant immunity sparingly. Commentators and judges
have suggested several means to remedy prosecutorial reluctance to
grant use immunity. The prosecutor could preserve the independence of
party, such as a judge, must conduct the in camera hearing. However, a judge at a pre-trial
hearing might encounter difficulty in determining whether the proposed testimony is exculpa-
tory and not merely cumulative. Thus, perhaps the better time to conduct such a hearing
would be after the defense is presented so the judge could determine if the evidence, in light of
the testimony already introduced, is exculpatory. This suggestion may create difficulties,
however, because of the interruption of trials. If the witness should invoke his fifth amend-
ment privilege at the in camera hearing, the judge should grant the witness immunity for the
limited purpose of that hearing. Since the testimony will be sealed, the prosecutor will not
have a chance to use it against the witness. In addition to the suggestion of an in camera
hearing, the author in Note, A New UseforlKastigar, supra note 16, proposes other solutions to
effectuate defense witness immunity: judicial review of the good faith of the prosecutor's
decision, and the prosecutor granting immunity or facing a "missing witness" instruction or
dropping the case. Id. at 88-96.
Judge Lumbard's dissent in Turkish regarding the propriety of in camera hearings envi-
sions such a proceeding as a bureaucratic disaster because in addition to the judge determin-
ing whether the prosecutor properly refused to grant immunity, the judge will also have to
determine whether the fifth amendment claims were made in good faith. 623 F.2d 780.
Whenever a witness invokes the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, how-
ever, the judge does not know whether it was done in good faith. The purpose behind an in
camera hearing is to determine whether the witness possesses exculpatory evidence, while
preventing the prosecutor from hearing the witness' potentially incriminating evidence.
The in camera hearing also largely protects against another of Judge Lumbard's fears.
Lumbard worries about "unnecessary disclosure of information by the prosecution" which
"increases the difficulties of administering criminal justice." Id. However, since the defense
attorney would not be present during the presentation of evidence to the judge by the prose-
cutor, in the in camera hearing, no unnecessary disclosure of evidence would take place ex-
cept to court reporters and other administrative aides.
104 623 F.2d at 775.
105 Granting use immunity permits the government to prosecute the witness, if the evi-
dence was derived independently of the immunized testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 460 (1972). Kastigar challenged the constitutionality of the use immunity statutes,
arguing that use immunity was not coextensive with the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court found that "immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is suffi-
cient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege," id., and that transactional immunity
was broader than the scope of the self-incrimination privilege. The Court concluded that use
immunity sufficiently protected a witness from other possible uses of the compelled testimony
because "'the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not
tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evi-
dence.'" Id. at 460.
106 At least one commentator has noted the difficulty of proving that evidence is indepen-
dently derived. See Simon, Federal Witness Immunity in Business Crime Investigations, 4 LrrICA-
,TON 17, 19 (1978).
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the evidence by placing sealed documents in the custody of the courts. 0 7
Rejecting this method, the Turkish court found this possibility inade-
quate when a continuing investigation disclosed "vital evidence after
though not resulting from, the immunized testimony."' 0 8 The United
States Attorneys' Manual directly addresses this concern, providing that
if a witness is granted immunity, but future prosecution may be war-
ranted, the United States attorney should "maintain a record of the na-
ture, source, and date of receipt of evidence concerning the witness's
past criminal conduct that becomes available after he has testified or
provided other information. ... 09
Another response to the concern about impairing future prosecu-
tions, suggested by the Virgin Islands court, is to delay the case to per-
mit the prosecution to gather more evidence on the potential witness. 110
Of course, this option would detract from the defendant's right to a
speedy trial."' A reasonable delay of a few weeks, however, may be
107 Goldberg v. United States, 472 F.2d 513, 516 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973) (the court suggested
that testimony could be sealed). See Note, The Public Has a Rzght to Every Man's Evidence, supra
note 17, at 1240, and Westen, Compulsog Process, supra note 17, at 169-70. Westen also sug-
gests several other methods to avoid an immunity bath for the witness, including "ordering
the defendant to submit his proposed questions for the witness in advance, and requiring the
witness to give responsive answers." Id. at 170.
The U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1-11.330 also establishes the following
guidelines for "Ensuring Integrty ofAny Future Prosecution:"
In a case in which a person is to testify or provide other information pursuant to a
compulsion order:
(a) if it then appears that the public interest may warrant a future prosecution of the
witness, on the basis of independent evidence, for his past criminal conduct about
which he is to be questioned, the attorney for the government shall:
(1) before the witness has testified or provided other information, prepare for the case
file a signed and dated memorandum summarizing the evidence then known to
exist concerning the witness, and designating its sources and date of receipt;
(2) ensure that all testimony given, or information provided, by the witness be re-
corded verbatim and that the recording or reporter's notes, together with any
transcript thereof, be maintained in a secure location and that access thereto be
documented; and
(3) maintain a record of the nature, source, and date of receipt of evidence concerning
the witness's past criminal conduct that becomes available after he has testified
or provided other information ....
108 623 F.2d at 775.
109 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1-11.330(b). In this situation, the Manual
also provides that the United States attorney should "ensure that all testimony, or informa-
tion provided by the witness be recorded verbatim. . . ." Id. The method suggested by the
Manual also provides an answer to Judge Lumbard's criticism in his dissent to Turkish where
he wrote that defense witness immunity would subject the prosecutor to a heavy burden to
maintain "separate staffs to ensure compliance with a restriction that no use may be made of
what the witness might say." 623 F.2d at 779. By keeping a careful log of information uncov-
ered by the prosecution, as the Manual suggests, the need to maintain separate staffs would
be alleviated.
110 615 F.2d at 973.
111 The sixth amendment guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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permissible to allow the prosecution to finish its investigation without
sacrificing the defendant's right to a speedy trial."e 2 Further, it would
not be unreasonable to require a defendant who wishes to obtain immu-
nity for a witness to waive his right to contest trial delays reasonably
necessary to avoide prejudice to the government by reason of the request
for immunity.
V. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENT
While citing the aforementioned policy reasons for rejecting defense
witness immunity, courts have emphasized that the major obstacle to
defense witness immunity is the disruption of the separation of powers
balance between the judicial and executive branches of government.'
13
As the court in Turkish wrote,
[h]ow these substantial concerns are to be weighed against the defendant's
interest in securing truthful exculpatory testimony through defense witness
immunity turns in large part upon whether the balancing of these interests
is appropriately a judicial function. The Government suggests it is not,
contending that the granting of immunity is pre-eminently a function of
the Executive Branch.14
It could be argued with equal plausibility that a determination whether
defense testimony is exculpatory and should be submitted to the jury is
112 The Supreme Court in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) held that "[t]he right
of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circum-
stances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice."
This holding was later reflected in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 214 (1967) where
the Court stated that a state may not "indefinitely postpone prosecution or an indictment
without stated justification." These cases indicate that delaying a case against a defendant to
gather evidence against a potential witness would constitute sufficient justification and would
properly balance the defendant's rights and the "rights of public justice." The Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976) lists numerous instances justifying a delay, inelcuding:
(8)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on
his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the
attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his
findings that the ends ofjustice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable
under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or
in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Id at (h)(8)(A). For a discussion of the Speedy Trial Act, see Steinberg, Right to Speedy5 Tal
The Constitutional Right and Its Applicability to the Speedy TrialAct of 1971, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C.
229 (1975).
113 For a good discussion of the relationship between defense witness immunity and the
separation of powers doctrine, see Note, The Public Has A Claim to Every Man's Evidence, supra,
note 17, at 1212-21 and Note, Separation of Powers, supra note 103, at 55-66.
114 623 F.2d at 776. Judge Lumbard, dissenting in Turkih, reiterated what he saw as a
grave separation of powers problem. "The judicial function exercised by the judge," Judge
Lumbard wrote, "should not be confused with the executive function to determine how to
prosecute defendants and present evidence against them." Id at 779.
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primarily a judicial function and not one which may properly be exer-
cised by a prosecutor. Fundamental rights should not turn on abstruse
conceptions of separation of powers.
Even if the issue is viewed as a conceptual separation of powers
issue, the separation of powers doctrine does not require that the three
branches of government "operate with absolute independence." 1 5 In
fact, the power of judicial review of legislative acts was established early
by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. 116 In addition to legislative
review, the judiciary can also review executive decisions, as did the
Court in United States v. NLion. 117 In the case of defense witness immu-
nity, separation of powers is arguably violated by judicial infringement
of prosecutorial discretion. Courts acknowledge that the prosecution
knows better what investigations are being conducted and the risks in-
volved in granting immunity to witnesses. 118  Courts are reluctant to
oversee and second-guess prosecutorial decisions because of the superior
knowledge of prosecutors. Yet, courts have limited this absolute prohi-
bition to the decision to initiate a prosecution. Refusing to sanction
prosecutorial misconduct, courts will intervene to grant a new trial or
order reversal when they find such misconduct.119 "[T]he 'control' exer-
cised by the courts over federal prosecutors has been limited to discour-
aging unethical behavior, pursuant to their authority and duty to
supervise the conduct of the United States Attorney as an officer of the
court. They simply refuse to permit the court to become a party to the
federal prosecutor's unethical or otherwise improper behavior."'
120
115 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
116 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Court in Marbug held that Congress unconstitution-
ally conferred upon the court original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the Secre-
tary of State, thereby enlarging the Court's jurisdiction in contravention of its Article III
powers. Marbug established that the Constitution was the "fundamental and paramount"
law and any legislative act "repugnant to the constitution, is void." Id at 177.
117 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Nixon established that the President's claim of executive privilege
in refiising to honor a subpoena duces tecum for "certain tapes, memoranda, papers, tran-
scripts or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President
and others," id at 688, which was rooted in the separation of powers doctrine, was out-
weighed by the need for "specific evidence" in a pending criminal trial. Id. at 713. For a
discussion of the separation of powers argument, see Note, The Public Has a Claim to Every
Man's Evidence, supra note 17, at 1214-21 and Note, Separation of Powers, supra note 103.
118 623 F.2d at 776.
119 Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (new trial ordered because prose-
cutor introduced facts in his summation that had not previously been admitted because of
defense attorney objections); Reichert v. United States, 389 F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(district court reversed because prosecutor in his closing statement based his argument on
excluded evidence).
120 Note, The Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 577,
594 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Special Prosecutor]. The authors suggest that prosecutorial
discretion, especially concerning the appointment of special prosecutors, is too broad and
should be reviewed like other decisions of executive officials.
1048 [Vol. 72
DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY
Examples of this supervisory control include judicial intervention
when the prosecutor, in his closing statement, introduces facts that have
not been admitted in evidence during the trial, 121 when the prosecutor
breaks an agreement with the defendant, 122 and when the prosecutor
fails to call perjured testimony to the attention of the court. 23 Al-
though a refusal to grant defense witness immunity might not rise to the
level of unethical or improper behavior, the court must supervise the
prosecutor to protect important constitutional rights of due process and
compulsory process. One commentator states that
[w]hen an individual defendant's constitutional rights are concerned,
courts have shown an even greater inclination to review discretionary acts.
If such acts deprive defendants of their rights, courts have felt free to re-
quire the prosecutor to take steps to insure that those rights are protected.
It seems logical that courts should take the same approach when faced
with a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity.124
Further support for the judicial power to review prosecutorial dis-
cretion in refusing to grant use immunity to a defendant's witnesses lies
in the history of immunity. The congressional grant of authority to the
prosecutor rests on an historical basis. 125 Immunity to compel a witness
to testify despite his fear of self-incrimination was originally conferred in
England by executive pardon. In Queen v. Boes, 126 a witness refused to
testify that he received a bribe from the defendant. To compel the wit-
ness to speak, "the counsel for the Crown handed a pardon under the
Great Seal to the witness."'127 The court held that the pardon protected
the witness from all further connected legal proceedings and compelled
the witness to testify.
Relying on the English precedent, the Supreme Court required the
early immunity statutes in the United States to be transactional and
hence very broad. Transactional immunity, like a pardon, precludes
prosecution of protected witnesses for any crime arising out of the same
transaction, event, or occurrence. 128 Thus, once transactional immunity
was granted, the witness could not be prosecuted.
121 See note 119 supra.
122 Note, The Special Prosecutor, supra note 120, at 594 n.99.
123 Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
124 Note, Sefparation of Powers, supra note 103, at 65. The author suggests that courts employ
a balancing test to determine if defense witness immunity should be granted and that the
separation of powers doctrine should not bar judicial review of prosecutorial discretion.
125 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 n. 13 (1972). This footnote in Kastigar
explains that immunity "indemnified" the witness from prosecution.
126 1 B. & S. 311, 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (Q.B. 1861).
127 id at 328-29, 121 Eng. Rep. at 731.
128 United States v. Earl, 361 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967). According to the Earl court, the transactional immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1406
(1964), provided that once immunized, witnesses were "granted immunity from prosecution
and penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any event or thing they testify about, and that
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The first immunity statute in the United States was passed in 1868
and was designed to encourage testimony before congressional commit-
tees.' 29 The statute was challenged in Counse/man v. Hitchcock 130 on the
ground that the immunity grant was not coextensive with the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court
agreed, finding that the statute did not preclude the government from
using the forced testimony to develop leads and gather evidence which
could later be used against the witness and "could not prevent the ob-
taining and use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which
he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer,
he could not possibly have been convicted."
13 1
To remedy the defects of the 1868 statute, Congress then passed
another statute132 which the Supreme Court in Brown v. Walker 133 found
constitutional, stating that since the witness had already been pardoned
"he cannot longer set up his privilege since he stands with respect to
such offense as if it had never been committed."'
134
Subsequent immunity statutes were challenged, but were upheld if
they granted transactional immunity to witnesses. Upholding the con-
stitutionality of the use immunity statutes enacted in 1970,135 the
Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States 136 found that transactional
immunity conferred broader protection than the self-incrimination priv-
ilege required. In contrast to transactional immunity statutes which
rendered the witness immune from prosecution, the use immunity stat-
utes, which "prohibit the prosecutorial authorities from using the com-
pelled testimony in any respect,"' 137 do not preclude further prosecution
of the witness based upon independent evidence. 138 Use immunity thus
departed from the historical concept of an executive pardon and instead
adopted this narrower standard for immunity. Under a grant of use
immunity, the witness is in no better or worse position than if he had not
been called to testify.
Since the original concept of immunity was an executive pardon,
their testimony shall not thereafter be used as evidence against them in any criminal proceed-
ing." Id
129 Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
130 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
131 Id at 564.
132 Act of Feb. 17, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443-44.
133 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
134 Id at 599.
135 See note 1 supra.
136 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
137 Id
138 Id See note 105 spra.
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the courts traditionally did not decide whether to grant immunity, for
the Constitution dictates that the pardoning power is absolute and en-
tirely an executive function. 139 With the creation of use immunity, how-
ever, the executive branch can no longer argue that in granting
immunity, the judiciary usurps an executive function since use immu-
nity still permits the later prosecution of the witness. There would
therefore appear to be little if any basis for the separation of powers
argument in the case of use immunity.
VI. A JUDICIALLY CREATED ALTERNATIVE
In the Virgin Islands case, the court held that if, on remand, the
district court found that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred at the
original trial, the defendant would be acquitted unless the prosecutor
granted immunity at a new trial.t4 This is a harsh remedy which leaves
the prosecution with no choice when prosecuting the defendant. Recog-
nizing that such action might not be justified when there was no
prosecutorial misconduct and recognizing the possible presence of a
"strong countervailing systemic interest" 141 the court outlined a less
drastic procedure for accommodating the rights of prosecution and de-
fense. The court's guidelines, designed to protect against judicial abuse
of the immunity power, are: (1) immunity must be properly sought in
the district court; (2) the defense witness must be available to testify; (3)
the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; and (4) no strong
139 U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), where a
presidential commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment without parole was up-
held, even though only two sentences were authorized for the crime: death or life imprison-
ment with the possibility of parole. The Court held that the pardoning power could not be
"modified, abridged or diminished by the Congress," id at 266, but "[t]he plain purpose of
the broad [constitutional] power conferred . . . was to allow plenary authority in the Presi-
dent to 'forgive' the convicted person ir, part or entirely, to reduce [the punishment], or to
alter it with conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable." Id
140 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980).
141 615 F.2d at 970. See United States v. McMichael, 492 F. Supp. 205 (D. Colo. 1980). In
McMichael, the trial judge was asked to immunize a defense witness who would testify that'
the defendant had "lack of knowledge," id at 206, of the contents of a box shipped from
Ecuador. Id at 207. The judge refused to grant immunity to the witness, and in dicta, criti-
cized and rejected the decision in Government of Virgin Islands .Smith. Finding that Virgin
Island's facts were unusual and were "a perfect example of a case in which hard facts make
• . .bad law," id at 206, the judge concluded that judicially created witness immunity does
not exist, "with the exception of an enunciation of a judicial power to order that statutory
immunity be granted with dismissal to follow if the grant does not issue." Id at 210.
In contrast to McMichael, and without finding prosecutorial misconduct, the court in
United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980), accepted and applied the Virgin
Islands tests. The Lowell court found that judicially conferred witness immunity could not be
granted because the proposed witness' testimony was not exculpatory, id at 905, and that
immunity was properly denied because the witness was a potential target of prosecution. Id
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governmental interests must countervail the grant of immunity. 42
Under these guidelines, the prosecution would have the opportunity to
rebut the defendant's showing of need and to establish that immunity
would be a disservice to the public interest 143 because of "significant
costs" to the government.' 44 Thus, defendants could not automatically
secure a grant of immunity for witnesses because courts would only con-
sider a judicially created immunity grant when the defendant's due pro-
cess rights were jeopardized and the public interest was not harmed.
VII. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY CHANGE
Most courts currently take the position that they are unable to im-
munize witnesses because the use immunity statutes grant the power to
immunize to the executive branch. Yet, several courts have invited the
legislature to intervene and change the statute to permit courts to grant
use immunity. 45 A possible model for statutory change would be a re-
142 615 F.2d at 972. The author in Note, The Public Has A Claim to Every Man's Evidence,
supra note 17, at 1235-36, suggests judicial use of a high materiality threshold requiring that
If the defendant shows that the testimony of a witness claiming the fifth amendment could
reasonably aFect the outcome of the case, and if the defense has no alternate source for the
identical evidence, the court should order the prosecution either to immunize the witness
or to drop the charges against the defendant.
(footnotes omitted).
143 The statute only permits use immunity grants which will serve the "public interest."
Although "public interest" is not defined in the statute, II WORKING PAPERS, supra note 80,
at 1433, characterizes the public interest inquiry as follows: "Is the public need for the partic-
ular testimony or documentary information in question so great as to override the social cost
of granting immunity and thereby possibly pardoning a person who has violated the criminal
law?"
An alternative description of the public interest, found in the U.S. ATrORNEYS' MAN-
UAL, supra note 65, § 1-11.2 10 suggests a balancing process:
In determining whether it may be necessary to the public interest to obtain testi-
mony or other information from a person, the attorney for the government should weigh
all relevant considerations, including:
(a) the importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement of
the criminal laws;
(b) the value of the person's testimony or information to the investigation or pros-
ecution;
(c) the likelihood of prompt and full compliance with a compulsion order, and
the effectiveness of available sanctions if there is no such compliance;
(d) the person's relative culpability in connecton with the offense or offenses be-
ing investigated or prosecuted, and his history with respect to criminal activ-
ity;
(e) the possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling him
to testify or produce information; and
(0 the likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if he testifies or
provides information under a compulsion order.
144 615 F.2d at 973. Significant costs include the government's inability to prosecute the
potential witness because of the heavy burden imposed to show that evidence was indepen-
dently derived. See notes 104-12 & accompanying text supra.
145 United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856
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pealed provision of the Illinois transactional immunity statute, 14 6 which
gave to courts the power to immunize:
Whenever. . . it shall appear to the court that another person than the
one charged is a material and necessary witness in the case, and that his
testimony would tend to criminate himself, the court may cause an order
to be entered of record that such witness be released from all liability to be
prosecuted or punished on account of any matter to which he shall be
required to testify .... 147
The statute was not challenged because courts acquired an immunity
power, but because the immunity conferred was not coextensive with
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the statute.
148
It may be suggested that the Illinois statute does not provide suffi-
cient guidelines for the courts. But guidelines which limit the circum-
stances in which immunity would be granted could be provided. One
way to effectuate this change in the context of section 6003149 would be
to add after the clause "in accordance with subsection (b) of this section,
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district" the
following provision: "or upon the order of the presiding judge, in ac-
cordance with subsection (c) of this section." Subsection (c) would con-
tain the following provisions:
(c) The presiding judge may enter an order under subsection (a) of
this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may
be necessary to the public interest 150 as defined in subsection (d) of this
section; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-in-
crimination.
(d) In determining the "public interest," the following factors will
be taken into account-
(1) whether the witness' testimony will be clearly exculpatory,
(2) whether the witness' testimony is cumulative,
(3) whether the potential witness is a target of investigation for
the same offenses.
The proposed statutory amendment preserves the power of the
prosecutor to grant immunity to witnesses. While respecting the prose-
(1981); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967).
146 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 35 (1874). There is no legislative history indicating why the
statute was repealed.
147 People v. Boyle, 312 Ill. 586, 602, 144 N.E. 342, 347-48 (1924).
148 Id
149 ee note 1 supra.
150 See note 143 supra.
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cutor's province, the provision permits a judge to grant immunity to a
defendant's witnesses upon a determination that such a grant will serve
the public interest. The "public interest" should be determined by bal-
ancing the degree to which the immunity grant will enhance the fact
finding process against the need to prosecute the witness.151 While the
guidelines should enable the courts to dispose of most cases in a consis-
tent manner, the proposal does leave room for conflicting decisions in a
case where the potential witness is a target but his testimony is clearly
exculpatory and noncumulative. The determination of public interest is
intended to reflect the case law which recognizes that minimizing the
effect of an immunity grant on the prosecutor's continuing investiga-
tions and possible future indictments is important. The overall effect of
the statute is to balance a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights
with the need for apprehending and convicting criminals. With this
statutory change, immunity will be sparingly granted, thus allaying the
fears of those who oppose granting immunity to defense witnesses.
CONCLUSION
Defense witness immunity is an issue that raises both fifth and sixth
amendment problems. Some courts recognize the need for compelling
immunity when there is prosecutorial misconduct. One court has indi-
cated that immunity should be granted based upon a general due pro-
cess right to produce exculpatory evidence. Courts argue that judicial
intervention on behalf of defendants may violate the separation of pow-
ers required by the Constitution, but this at best conceptual argument is
unsound because the use immunity statutes alter the traditional concept
of the granting of a pardon under the transactional immunity statutes.
While use immunity does not preclude future prosecution of a witness,
and while the policy objections to grants of immunity to defense wit-
nesses are not persuasive, courts are reluctant to accept judicially cre-
ated defense witness immunity even with proper safeguards. The
inadequacies in these judicial remedies dictate that legislatures amend
use immunity statutes. This change would retain immunity as a
prosecutorial power, but would also confer power on the courts to grant
immunity to defense witnesses if the statutory tests which emphasize
.public interest considerations are fulfilled. This statutory change will
enable courts to balance effectively important societal interests with fun-
damental contitutional rights.
ELLEN SHERIFF
151 Id
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